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Abstract. This paper provides a non-technical overview of NEG models deal-
ing with policy issues. Considered policy measures include alternative categories
of public expenditure, international tax competition, unilateral actions of
protection/liberalisation, and trade agreements. The implications of public
intervention in two-region NEG models are discussed by unfolding the impact of
policy measures on agglomeration/dispersion forces. Results are described in
contrast with those obtained in standard non-NEG theoretical models. The high
degree of abstraction limits the applicability of NEG models to real world policy
issues. We discuss in some detail two extensions of NEG models to reduce this
applicability gap: the cases of multi-regional frameworks and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
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1 Policy Issues in NEG Models: A General Discussion
1.1 NEG Models in a Nutshell
In his seminal contribution,Krugman (1991) presented an intriguing andmost stimulating
argumentation: even if countries were identical, an uneven distribution of economic
activity may emerge endogenously. The central mechanism is the following: Assume two
identical regions that produce a homogenous agricultural commodity and differentiated
manufacturing commodities. Markets for manufactured goods are monopolistically
competitive (in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz set up with decreasing average costs in
production and a love for variety utility function); trading commodities between regions is
possible, but involves trade costs (that do not occur when selling commodities in the local
market). In that environment, ﬁrms that have access to a larger local market have higher
proﬁts and are able to pay higher wages. Higher factor rewards, in turn, attract
factor migration towards this region (or trigger more intense capital formation).
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If migration is combined with a relocation of commodity demand, the local market size
increases, which leads to even more migration – agglomeration is the result of a
self-reinforcing factor migration process (or in some model variants of a self-reinforcing
process of capital formation or ﬁrm entry). In models in which the mobile factor are
workers, this so-called market size effect is enhanced by a price index effect. Variety
loving consumers buy all commodity variants – irrespective of whether they are produced
locally or imported. Therefore, the respective consumer price index is lower in the region
inwhichmore variants are produced locally (that do not involve transport costs), i.e. in the
region with more ﬁrms. Workers thus migrate to the bigger region not only because ﬁrms
are able to pay higher wages, but also because of the lower consumer price index.
A competition effect works against these two agglomerative forces: with more ﬁrms in a
market, themarket niche of a single ﬁrmmay shrink, even if the overall market size in that
region has increased.
In more recent model variants, the competition effect may be enhanced via a
variable mark-up – with more ﬁrms in the local market, the mark-up, which each single
entrepreneur may charge, is reduced. Note that the last effect requires a departure from
the standard Dixit-Stiglitz modelling of monopolistic competition. In these models, the
CES utility function (giving rise to iso-elastic demand functions) is replaced by a
log-linear utility function (that gives rise to linear demand functions implying varying
mark-ups for monopoly pricing).
NEG models typically show that the competition effect dominates for high trade
costs and an even regional distribution of economic activity emerges. Instead,
agglomeration forces prevail for lower trade costs and a core-periphery pattern of
economic activity appears. Given the symmetry of regions, agglomeration can appear
in either of the two regions. In many models, both types of equilibrium co-exist as
(locally) stable ﬁxed points for intermediate levels of trade costs. In that case, small
shocks may trigger a self-reinforcing process leading from a symmetric industry dis-
tribution to a core-periphery pattern. The direction of the small shock determines which
region gets the core. In more technical terms: both types of equilibria have their own
basin of attraction and small shocks can push the economy from one basin of attraction
into the basin of attraction of another equilibrium. Thus, history matters for the
long-run evolution of economic activity, which is an often-reiterated theme of NEG
(see Krugman 1992). Another implication of the multiplicity of coexisting equilibria is
that an economic evolution may not be reversible and hysteresis phenomena occur in
the spatial pattern of economic activity.
The change in the locally available quantities of productive factors is at the core of
each NEG model. Therefore, it is very common to classify models according to the
mobility assumptions (see Baldwin et al. 2003; Brakman et al. 2001). We will use this
classiﬁcation also in this chapter:
Core-periphery model (CP, see Krugman 1991): Workers are mobile between
regions but not between sectors. Since worker spend their income locally, demand is
mobile as well.
Footloose entrepreneur model (FE, see Forslid 1999; Ottaviano 2001; and Forslid
and Ottaviano 2003): Entrepreneurs (with their knowledge capital) are mobile between
regions (but not between sectors). Entrepreneurs spend their income locally; therefore,
demand is mobile as well.
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Footloose capital model (FC, see Martin and Rogers 1995): Manufactured goods
require entrepreneurial knowledge capital (blueprints). While capital is mobile between
regions in search of the highest nominal reward, it is assumed that the capital earnings
are remitted back to the owner who is regionally immobile. Hence, in that model class,
factor mobility does not lead to a relocation of demand, which considerable simpliﬁes
the analytics, at the cost of losing some of the core features of a NEG model.
Constructed capital model (CC, see Baldwin 1999): There is no factor mobility
between regions. However, capital is accumulated (constructed), possibly at different
rates in both regions, which also may lead to agglomeration.
Vertical linkages model (VL, see Venables 1996; and Krugman and Venables
1995): This model class introduces input-output relations. Workers are not mobile
between regions, but between sectors. They may move out of agriculture into newly
created input ﬁrms, which may lead to a different regional industrial development and
to agglomeration.
1.2 Policy in NEG Models: Fundamental Questions and the Applicability
Gap
The highly abstract model construction with initially identical regions is the sparkling
core of Krugman’s argument. Even at this very abstract level, policy issues immedi-
ately emerge. Multiple equilibria with varying stability properties beg the question
whether they are equivalent, viewed through the lens of a social welfare function. In
addition, a typical NEG model involves several inefﬁciencies: most obvious, monop-
olistic price setting leads to socially inferior outcomes; in a context of imperfect
competition, any change in the locally available amount of productive factors involves
pecuniary externalities that are welfare relevant. There is a small strand of literature that
addresses such questions explicitly: Ottaviano and Thisse (2001), Ottaviano et al.
(2002), Ottaviano and Thisse (2002), Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), and more recently
Pflüger and Südekum (2008) and Grafeneder-Weissteiner et al. (2015). We would like
to point out two interesting results of this strand of literature: a ﬁrst result relies on the
possible multiplicity of equilibria. Those papers show the possibility of
over-agglomeration, i.e. a situation in which decentralized market processes without
policy intervention lead to agglomeration, while the symmetric equilibrium exhibits a
higher social welfare. The papers take this as a basis for regional redistributive policy,
either in the form of restrictions on factor mobility (in order to prevent agglomeration)
or in the form of interregional transfers to compensate the periphery. A second result
focusses on the stability properties: Given the monopolistic set up, the symmetric,
stable equilibrium may quite well be inefﬁcient and policy interventions can increase
the social welfare (in the symmetric equilibrium). However – and this is the interesting
result – these optimal policy interventions may change the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium that becomes unstable; thus, an allegedly optimal policy
intervention may lead to unintended agglomeration.
A related policy topic that already emerges at a very abstract level are distributive
issues, which actually are pervasive in NEG models. The utility level of the immobile
workers left behind in the periphery is lower than the utility level of the workers in the
core region. In such a situation, using a social welfare function is not without problems.
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Charlot et al. (2006) point out that a simple utilitarian social welfare function actually
reflects indifference to inequality and the authors suggest using a more general CES
speciﬁcation that allows reflecting various attitudes towards inequality. Charlot et al.
(2006) show that the attitude towards inequality heavily influences the result; however,
over-agglomeration is a possibility also in their framework.
Leaving these fundamental policy questions aside, prototype NEG models with two
initially identical regions are often used to assess the impact of various policy measures –
including tariffs, free-trade agreements, customs unions, taxes, subsidies, and public
expenditures on items such as infrastructure, transport systems, and R&D – on the
regional distribution of economic activity. We review this literature in the following
sections. Each section start with the analysis for two regions and, subsequently, we
discuss whether the two regions’ results carry over to a multi-regional framework (for the
latter see Commentatore et al. 2015).
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the extreme degree of abstraction limits
the applicability of NEG models to real world policy issues and that NEG models were
extended in various directions to reduce this applicability gap: Many NEG models
allow for different country sizes. The admittedly simplistic representation of geography
in NEG is a highly disputed issue and several extension are found in the literature.
Most recently, some NEG models include ﬁrm heterogeneity. We explicitly discuss the
last two issues and start with extensions concerning geography.
It was Krugman (1993) who borrowed from Cronon’s famous book “Nature’s
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West” (see Cronon 1991) the notions of “ﬁrst
nature” and “second nature”. First nature regional differences are exogenous to eco-
nomic activity, e.g. endowment with natural resources, geographical location – cen-
trality, location at the sea, at a river, in the mountains – and geopolitical factors (see
also Venables 2006; Roos 2005). First nature asymmetries can easily explain an
asymmetric regional distribution of economic activity. However, the main achievement
of the New Economic Geography is to show that even when starting with ﬁrst nature
identical regions, endogenous economic – i.e. second nature – processes may bring
about a very uneven regional distribution of economic activity. In typical NEG models,
ﬁrst nature geography plays a minimal role. Regions are separated by (symmetric)
transportation or trade costs (see also the discussion in Østbye 2010). In the unfolding
of the NEG paradigm over the last decades, some contributions do bring back ﬁrst
nature differences and study their interaction with second nature agglomeration pro-
cesses (for overviews see Fujita and Mori 2005 and Venables 2006). In the next
paragraphs, we present two possibilities found in the literature for incorporating ﬁrst
nature differences into NEG models and discuss whether the basic NEG mechanisms
are still relevant.
The ﬁrst approach consists of assuming differences in trade costs, conveying ﬁrst
nature advantages to some regions. Krugman (1993) and Ago et al. (2006) analyse
three (or more) regions located on a line, which gives a locational advantage to the
middle region. Fujita and Mori (1996) also analyse a multi-region model in which some
locations have a ﬁrst nature locational advantage (e.g. a port functioning as transport
hub). Østbye (2010) analyses a two region model in which one region has a ﬁrst nature
advantage because of trade links with an outside region. Differences in the trade costs
change the strength of the various agglomeration and dispersion forces. A centrally
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located region has an advantage in accessing markets. However, it is also subject to a
stronger competition effect. The papers typically show that second nature forces may
dominate ﬁrst nature advantages. Krugman (1993) and Ago et al. (2006) show that
agglomeration may not occur at the geographical center, instead intense competition in
the middle region can force manufacturing to move out and agglomeration occurs in
more peripheral regions. The typical NEG theme of irreversibility and regional hys-
teresis resonates in the results found in Fujita and Mori (1996): A region that became
the core because of ﬁrst nature advantages may continue to be core even if it had lost its
ﬁrst nature advantage. An example for this is a natural port that functioned as transport
hub and that lost this ﬁrst nature advantage due to innovations in the transport system.
A second approach to model ﬁrst nature disparities is to specify productivity dif-
ferences between the regions (possibly due to regional differences in the endowment
with natural resources), i.e. to introduce Ricardian (comparative or absolute) advan-
tages into a NEG framework.
NEG models typically show that for high trade costs both agglomeration (such as
market access and price index effect) and dispersion forces (such as the competition
effect) are strong. In addition, they typically show that for high trade costs dispersion
forces dominate and that an equal regional distribution of economic activity emerges.
Instead, for low trade costs, both forces are weaker and agglomeration forces dominate,
which leads to a core-periphery pattern of economic activity. Comparative advantages
add another dispersion force, since each region attracts industry that uses its speciﬁc
comparative advantage, the strength of which does not vary with trade costs. Therefore,
for low trade costs both NEG forces are weak and comparative advantage dominates,
and this leads to a dispersed industry structure. Instead, for intermediate and high trade
costs NEG forces dominate. In particular, for intermediate trade costs NEG agglom-
eration forces shape the regional distribution of industry and its regional specialization
(and thus trading) pattern may not follow comparative advantages. For high trade costs,
NEG dispersion forces lead to an equally distributed industry, perhaps biased towards
comparative advantage (see e.g. Picard and Zeng 2010; Forslid and Wooton 2003, see
also the related contributions by Ricci 1999; Bagoulla 2006; Matsuoka and Kikuchi
2012; Pflüger and Tabuchi 2016; and Commendatore et al. 2017). In an interesting
related paper, Matsuyama and Takahashi (1998) analyse a two regions model that also
includes Ricardian advantages into a NEG perspective. The authors show that allowing
for factor migration may overturn the comparative advantage structure; in addition,
they explicitly address the above mentioned welfare issues and show that in some cases
agglomeration may be socially undesirable.
After having discussed the representation of geography in NEG models, we turn to
another direction of increasing the degree of realism: The “new new economic geog-
raphy” (NNEG, see Ottaviano 2011) loosens the symmetry assumption by introducing
ﬁrm heterogeneity á la Melitz (2003), i.e. introducing ﬁrms that differ wrt productivity.
This not only allows asking under which conditions ﬁrms or workers chose to
agglomerate or disperse across space, but also if more or less productive ﬁrms behave
differently in this process.
Baldwin and Okubo (2006) are the ﬁrst to integrate part of the Melitz framework
into the FC model. Firm heterogeneity is introduced by different marginal costs for
each ﬁrm and these differences follow a Pareto distribution. Furthermore, switching
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regions is associated with a quadratic cost function. While the regions are symmetric in
tastes and technology, one region is assumed larger in terms of the number of ﬁrms and
workers. As in the FC model, there is a tendency for ﬁrms to move towards the larger
region, which is governed by agglomeration forces. Probably not surprising, the most
productive ﬁrms move ﬁrst. They can bear the costs associated with moving most
easily. Therefore, there is a maximum marginal cost that drives the relocation of ﬁrms
from the smaller to the larger market. As trade gets freer, more ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
relocate to the larger region. The introduction of heterogeneity does not alter the break
and sustain points derived in the standard FC model. However, measured in terms of
the number of ﬁrms, relocation costs combined with differences in productivity act as a
dispersion force as fewer ﬁrms are able to relocate to the larger market. This leads to a
selection effect meaning that only particular ﬁrms agglomerate in the equilibrium.
While the FC model is rather simple but lacks some features of other NEG models,
Okubo (2009) shows how ﬁrm heterogeneity works in the still tractable footloose
capital vertical linkages model (FCVL). Symmetric regions additionally allow for the
possibility of endogenous asymmetry. Similar to the former paper, Okubo (2009) ﬁnds
that ﬁrm heterogeneity has a moderating effect on the relocation process. In this model,
there is a stepwise agglomeration process. The most productive ﬁrms that already
exported from the smaller region relocate ﬁrst and stay (net-) exporters. Second, there
are ﬁrms that sold only locally but become exporters once they relocate to the larger
region. Finally, there are ﬁrms that only sold locally in the smaller market and that stay
a local seller in the larger market. The existence of the last type of ﬁrm in the larger
region lowers the strength of the agglomeration forces and increases the strength of the
dispersion force, the agglomeration process is gradual and only partial. The author also
shows that a decrease in the ﬁxed costs that are associated with exporting strengthens
the agglomeration forces making full agglomeration a possibility. What is more, he
argues that in his model, trade integration leads to a divergence in welfare with the
individuals in the larger market being better off.
In a linear setup, Okubo et al. (2010) focus on the role of competition and its
relationship to location choice of differently productive ﬁrms. Their results indicate that
efﬁcient and inefﬁcient ﬁrms move away from each other similar to the analysis dis-
cussed above. At some point of trade integration, all productive ﬁrms are in the larger
market, while all less productive ﬁrms remain in the smaller market shielding them-
selves from competition. However, deeper market integration makes it harder for
high-cost ﬁrms to avoid competition and the agglomeration advantages exceed the
competition effect. So there might be a non-monotonic relation between trade inte-
gration and the sorting of ﬁrms.
By employing a version of the FE model, Ottaviano (2012) demonstrates how ﬁrm
heterogeneity affects the relative strength of agglomeration and dispersion forces.
Entrepreneurs ﬁrst develop blue prints that are needed for production. Only after
observing their productivity do ﬁrms decide whether to use them in order to produce.
The blue prints depreciate at the end of the period. Similar to the papers before, the
model exhibits partial agglomeration when trade barriers fall. The authors pay partic-
ular attention to the different effects that a variation of the scale and the shape
parameters of the (Pareto) distribution has on the ﬁrm selection at the equilibrium.
18 P. Commendatore et al.
Baldwin and Okubo (2014) update their previous work by including entry and exit
of ﬁrms as well as ﬁxed market entry costs, so-called “beachhead costs”. Firms are also
able to relocate after their initial location choice or vice versa, they might enter or exit a
market after they have relocated.
Incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity into NEG models introduces new and interesting
variations of the classic NEG mechanisms. There is still agglomeration and dispersion
across space driven by the respective forces. However, agglomeration can be gradual
and not every ﬁrm is equally likely to move to the larger markets. Thus, in equilibrium,
not only the number of ﬁrms may be different between regions, but also the distribution
of their productivities. This is relevant for welfare analyses. The presence of ﬁrm
heterogeneity may therefore also alter some policy implications of NEG models.
2 Public Spending: Productivity and Demand Effects
NEG scholars have studied the impact of different categories of public expenditure on
industrial location within different variants of NEG frameworks. The non-exhaustive
survey covered in this section uses the typical distinction between unproductive and
productive public spending to classify these models and elaborates on the main
channels through which public intervention influences industrial location. In the ﬁrst
case, the government provides an additional channel to the “market-access” effect, via
the so-called “demand” effect. Tax revenues are spent in consumption goods, thus
ﬁnancing an additional source of local demand for manufactured goods and magnifying
the “market-access” effect. On the other hand, the so-called productive categories of
public spending affect ﬁrms’ location via a “productivity” effect exerted on the supply
side of the economy. Investment in R&D, transportation and other types of
productivity-enhancing infrastructures affect production in the manufacturing sector via
their positive impact on factors’ productivity.
The ﬁrst group of works, which includes Trionfetti (1997 and 2001) and Brülhart
and Trionfetti (2004), contradict the standard result obtained by Baldwin (1970, 1984)
in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework according to which home-bias public procurement is
neutral for the determination of a country’s pattern of specialisation. Trionfetti (1997)
adds public expenditure to a standard two-country/two-region CP model. To focus on
the “pure” demand effect of public expenditure, this author makes two important
simplifying assumptions excluding other effects, which could arise from alternative
uses of public resources or from taxation policies: The government spends all tax
revenues on manufactured goods, which are destroyed after the purchase. Moreover,
the income of the mobile factor, i.e. manufacturing workers’ income, is not taxed.
The additional public demand for manufactured goods increases local demand. This
creates a new demand-linked effect in the model, which can, under certain conditions,
dominate all the others and, acting as a dispersion force, may lead to a stable equi-
librium with partial spatial concentration and no catastrophic agglomeration. A crucial
result is that, by allocating a larger amount of public expenditure to the domestic
manufacturing good, for a given level of the expenditure of the other government, a
government can enlarge the share of the domestic industry: public expenditure exerts a
“pull” effect on the location of industry. Trionfetti (1997) also briefly considers the
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effects of different intergovernmental transfer schemes (pure transfers, tied aid and joint
expenditure) showing that these effects depend on how public expenditure is allocated
between sectors and domestic and foreign goods.
The above reported result of public expenditure favoring dispersion over agglom-
eration emerges independently from the employed variant of NEG framework. Trion-
fetti (2001) and Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004) accommodate for government
procurement in the VL version of the CP model (Krugman and Venables 1995). The
differentiated manufacturing good is used as an intermediate input by the manufacturing
sector itself as well as by national governments for the provision of public services.
When public procurement is home-biased, industrial agglomeration cannot occur. One
or three long-run equilibria may exist depending on the parameter settings. If countries
are identical, the central equilibrium is symmetric and can be either stable or unstable. In
the latter case, the industrial sector partially agglomerates in one country (the one with
the larger initial endowment of the mobile factor), with the second country keeping
some industry: public expenditure exerts a “spread” effect on industry. In Trionfetti
(2001), it is also shown that home-biased public procurement may reduce inequalities
and, under speciﬁc circumstances, be welfare improving. Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004)
put forward an empirical analysis aiming to validate the main predictions of their model
concerning the “pull” and “spread” effects of home-biased public procurement.
The group of models dealing with the effects of productivity-enhancing public
spending includes, among others, Brakman et al. (2002 and 2008) where the FE model is
extended in order to include a government sector, which directly produces public goods
that may enhance regional competitiveness. Public goods – produced under a constant
returns of scale (CRS) technology that uses only variable human capital – are “pro-
ductive” in that they reduce both ﬁxed and variable costs of manufacturing ﬁrms1.
Brakman et al. (2008) assume that the amount of public capital is ﬁxed; whereas in
Brakman et al. (2002), public capital is a share of the overall capital. Another difference
between the two models is that in the latter one public goods also affects the individuals’
utility function. Two important features of these analyses are as follows. First, the
provision of public goods is ﬁnanced by a uniform income tax. A tax levied also on the
mobile factor acts as a spreading force. Second, the effect of public goods on factors’
productivity is entirely local, reinforcing agglomeration. The main conclusions of these
works are: When equal amounts of public goods are provided in the two regions, an
increase of such provision perturbates the equilibrium between agglomeration and
dispersion forces, thus fostering agglomeration if sufﬁciently large. When the provision
of public goods in the two regions is asymmetric, numerical evidence shows that the
attractiveness of locations is influenced by their endowments of public goods, con-
ﬁrming that the “pull” effect of public expenditure, as partial agglomeration occurs in the
region with the larger endowment of public goods. However, if in one of the two regions
public expenditure is more effective in reducing production costs or public capital is
more efﬁcient in the production of the public good, Brakman et al. (2002) show that even
1 The ﬁxed cost component embodies knowledge-intensive activities such as “R&D, marketing and
management”; whereas both ﬁxed and variable costs are affected by the quality of social and
economic infrastructures.
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if this region has a lower endowment of public or private inputs it could still attract the
larger share of the manufacturing industry. Finally, when cost reduction is sufﬁciently
large to offset the tax increase necessary to ﬁnance its production public expenditure
may also have a positive impact on the overall number of ﬁrms of the economy.
The ﬁrst group of models, focussing on the demand effect, deliberately abstract
from the productivity effect: Typically, public expenditure affects industrial location
through demand, while any impact on factors’ productivity is neglected as public
intervention is not assumed to affect the production function in the manufacturing
sector. In the same manner, scholars dealing with the productivity effect deliberately
abstract from the demand effect. The contributions by Commendatore et al. (2008,
2009 and 2010) are at the crossroads between these two groups of models as they
suggest to jointly study the interplay between the demand and productivity effects of
public policy in the same framework.
The framework chosen by Commendatore et al. (2008) is a two-region CC model
with mobile capital, which extends the FC model allowing for the endogenous
construction/depreciation of capital goods. In the model the asymmetric regional dis-
tribution of the immobile factor (labour) between the North (the “rich” or “advanced”
region) and the South (the “poor” or “backward” region) translate into different market
sizes. The overall economy is composed of four sectors: agriculture, manufacturing,
investment sector and government sector. In the investment sector the mobile factor
(capital) is produced under perfect competition with a CRS technology involving the
use of labour. Capital is used in ﬁxed amounts both by the government (as the only
production factor with a CRS technology) and in manufacturing (coupled with the
variable labour input). A central (national) government produces a local public good,
which enhances labour productivity in the investment and manufacturing sectors.2 In
this framework the authors address two main questions revealing a possible trade-off
between overall efﬁciency and regional equity: how the provision and the ﬁnancing of
productive public investments impact on the overall stock of private capital and on its
distribution across the regions.
An increase in the provision of productivity-enhancing public capital does not
always increase the overall private capital as the regional and sectoral distribution of the
public investments matters. The “productivity” effect tends to increase private capital,
while a “crowding-out” effect between public and private investments works in the
opposite direction. Assuming that the investment sector agglomerates where its pro-
duction is less costly and that the provision of the public good occurs in the other region,
the overall capital stock will unambiguously decline due to the “crowding-out effect”.
On the other hand, if the provision of public goods occurs in the region where the
investment good sector is located and the productivity gain in that sector is sufﬁciently
large to overcome the “crowding out” effect, the overall capital stock will increase.
Concerning the effect on the allocation of private capital between the regions, the
long-run outcome depends on the combined impact of the two possible effects of public
2 As in Brakman et al. (2002) the overall capital stock is composed of public and private capital. On
the other hand, differently from that contribution, local public goods (public expenditure in research,
innovation and education) do not enter in agents’ utility.
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expenditure on manufacturing production: the “productivity effect” – a larger provision
of public services in one region, by lowering the labour input requirement, attracts ﬁrms
to that region; and the “demand effect” – the tax rise necessary to ﬁnance such provision,
by contracting private expenditure for manufactures, induces a non-favorable change in
the relative market size, driving away ﬁrms from that region. The relevant policy
conclusion is that a central government whose aim is to reduce regional inequalities, can
choose a suitable ﬁnancing scheme for public expenditure that could weaken the
demand effect inducing ﬁrms to relocate in the backward region. The demand effect will
be negligible if also taxpayers residing in the advanced region contribute on the basis of
their income to the ﬁnancing. Finally, it is also possible that the provision of public
goods in the South could, even in the presence of the “crowding-out” effect, increase the
local level of private capital or could improve welfare in that region.
These results are in general conﬁrmed in the much simpler FC setting without
investment sector considered by Commendatore et al. (2009), where it is shown that the
provision of a productivity-enhancing local public good may redistribute the industrial
activity, counterbalancing differences in market sizes between regions. Furthermore, it
is also conﬁrmed that the process of agglomeration in the larger region following
market integration could be slowed down or even overturned by increasing sufﬁciently
the provision of productive public expenditure.
Commendatore et al. (2010) relax the assumption of pure local effects of productive
public expenditure within a FC framework. Focusing on the case of R&D public
expenditure, the authors explore how knowledge creation and diffusion across regions
impinges upon the processes of spatial agglomeration and dispersion. The
productivity-enhancing effect of public expenditure takes place by lowering ﬁxed costs
in the manufacturing sector, so that the number of ﬁrms may vary even if the number of
capital units is given. Hence, public policy can impact on the endogenous number of
ﬁrms as well. Two possible scenarios are studied. In the ﬁrst scenario, knowledge
spillovers – in the form of new ideas generated in public universities and research
institutions – are (perfectly) global beneﬁtting all ﬁrms independently of their location.
In this scenario, public policy is able to affect the number of ﬁrms as a lower number of
these units is required for each variety of the manufactured good: an increase in public
expenditure unambiguously increase the total number of varieties. On the other hand,
public policy is unable to affect the regional distribution of capital units. However, if
the productivity effect is weak, the demand effect can reduce the dimension of the
industrial sector in the region that ﬁnances public expenditure. In the second scenario,
knowledge spillovers are (partially/perfectly) local. The impact of knowledge on
productivity gains is spatially limited depending on its local speciﬁcity and on the
absorbing capacity of ﬁrms, so that knowledge generated by R&D activities beneﬁts
ﬁrms, which are located in the region where public expenditures occurs. In this sce-
nario, as in Commendatore et al. (2008 and 2009), both productivity and demand
effects play a role in determining the equilibrium regional shares of capital as well as
the number of varieties produced in each region. Moreover, it is shown that the rela-
tionship between the overall number of ﬁrms and public expenditure could be
non-monotonic. These results hold in the dispersed equilibrium, when the at least some
industry is located in both regions. In an agglomerated equilibrium, when industrial
sector is concentrated only in one region, the total number of ﬁrms always increases
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with public expenditure except in the case of perfectly local spillovers when industry is
agglomerated in the region where the R&D activities do not occur. This conclusion
reveals a trade-off between efﬁciency and equity, which typically emerges in models
where the appropriability of knowledge has a spatial dimension.
Recently, so-called new economic geography and growth (NEGG) models intro-
duce a R&D sector to explain the dynamic processes giving rise to spatial agglomer-
ation and growth. This strand of NEG literature – which jointly considers the spatial
and the temporal dimension of the economic development – is mainly based on the
endogenous growth models of the Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990)
type. NEGG models abandon the typical NEG assumption of a ﬁxed stock of resources,
bringing to the fore the trade-growth relationship (Martin and Ottaviano 1999; Baldwin
et al. 2003; Fujita and Thisse 2002; Dupont 2007; Cerina and Mureddu 2012; and for
reviews Baldwin et al. 2003, Chap. 7; Baldwin and Martin 2004; Cerina and Pigliaru
2007; and Breinlich et al. 2014). The main engine of growth is technological change
due to R&D investments and the spatial diffusion of knowledge plays a fundamental
role. Moreover, once it is taken into account that knowledge spillovers may exhaust
their effect with distance, NEGG models predict a potential trade-off between accu-
mulation and territorial cohesion, giving rise to uneven growth. This extends to the
very long-run the government dilemma over the choice between efﬁciency and equity.
A paradigmatic example of a NEGGmodel exploring how public policy may impact
on agglomeration and growth is the dynamic version of the FC model put forward by
Martin and Rogers (1995) and (1998, 1999) and reformulated in Baldwin et al. (2003,
Chap. 17). As in Martin and Rogers (1995), in Martin (1998, 1999) public policy may
improve intra-regional transport infrastructure – facilitating domestic trade (transport
infrastructures, law and contract enforcement and network communications) – and
inter-regional/international transport infrastructures – facilitating trade between regions
(international communication and transportation system). Moreover, in the presence of
partially local spillovers, better transport infrastructures may improve inter-regional
knowledge transfer. Envisaging a more advanced region (North) where the investment
sector is located and a backward region (South), it is possible to single out the effects of
speciﬁc policies and study how they can mitigate/exacerbate the trade-off between
equity and efﬁciency: (i) a persistent income transfer to the South reduces income
inequality and favours dispersion of the economic activity at the cost of a lower growth
rate of the overall economy; (ii) an investment in local (intra-regional) infrastructures in
the South may reduce spatial equity at the cost of a larger north-south and
capitalists-workers income inequality and a smaller rate of growth of the overall
economy; (iii) an investment in (inter-regional) infrastructures favours agglomeration in
the North but reduces income inequalities and enhances the growth of the overall
economy. Finally, (iv) policies aiming to increase the spatial diffusion of knowledge
(such as, investment in telecommunication infrastructures, in internet access or in
human capital, and so on) does not suffer the trade-off between equity and efﬁciency.
Indeed, such a policy may reduce both spatial and income inequalities in correspon-
dence of a higher rate of growth of the whole economy.
A limit shared by all the above discussed analyses is that they only consider
economies composed of two regions, not allowing for third-region (indirect) effects and
complex feedbacks emerging in a multi-region framework or on the role of geography
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(characterizing the accessibility of regions or their endowments of immobile factors or
natural resources, and so on) shaping this framework. Indeed, in the words of Desmet
and Rossi-Hansberg (2010, p. 44): “[t]he focus on a small number of locations does not
allow this literature to capture the richness of the observed distribution of economic
activity across space, thus restricting the way these models are able to connect with the
data”. Thus, according to these authors, the assumption of a small number or regions
represents the greatest weakness of NEGG (and a fortiori NEG) models. In various
contributions, these authors (see Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg 2009, 2010 and 2014) put
forward a theory of spatial development in which space, and therefore the number of
locations, is represented as a continuum. Behrens et al. (2007) put forward a study on a
spatial network composed of nine regions with a speciﬁc geography (part of the network
has a tree structure and another a circular structure), clarifying that it is not easy (excepts
for speciﬁc network conﬁgurations) to derive clear-cut general analytic results and
therefore to develop the welfare analysis necessary to formulate policy recommenda-
tions. In their speciﬁc set-up standard results related to preferential trade agreements
(which have a global impact over the network) should be better speciﬁed taking into
account changes in transport infrastructures (whose impact has a more local nature).
The richness of results delivered in multi-region frameworks dealing with the
importance of different public policies can be exempliﬁed by referring to the attempts
made in the three regions case. Baldwin et al. (2003, Chap. 17) consider an economy
where three regions are allocated equidistantly on a line representing a hub-and-spoke
economy, where the central region is poor and the two at the borders are rich. They
show that the result according to which an increase in interregional infrastructures
favors agglomeration in the rich region (Martin and Rogers 1995; Martin 1998 and
1999) is overturned depending on the balancing between the “home market” effect
favoring the two rich regions and the “central place” effect giving an advantage to the
poor region.
Forslid (1994) conﬁrms that results, which hold in a two-region context cannot
always be applied when three regions are considered. This author extends the standard
static FC model by introducing three (advanced, intermediate, and poor) regions with
different size evaluating how different policies may counterbalance the effects of trade
integration. With no policy intervention, at initial stages economic integration leads to
deindustrialization in the smaller region (with both the larger and the indeterminate
gaining industry) and at later stages to full agglomeration in the larger region (with the
intermediate region losing all industry). Relocation of governmental agencies to the
periphery, i.e. to one of the smaller regions, could counteract this process. However, if
only public capital is transferred to the smaller region, if integration is not complete the
reduction of private capital stock in the intermediate region is larger than the stock of
governmental capital shifted to the smaller region, thus the net gain for the two
peripheral regions following the policy is negative. Relocating public employees as
well may advantage both the large and the intermediate region when integration is not
too strong. Instead, relocating government capital in the intermediate region may lead
to an equal capital distribution between the larger and the intermediate region.
Investment in transport infrastructures reducing distance between the larger region and
the other two strongly favours the ﬁrst, which becomes a hub, whereas the smaller
peripheral region suffers an acceleration of deindustrialization. The same would apply
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to the smaller region by reducing its distance with the intermediate region. The latter
gains all the industry with trade liberalization. Finally, regional subsidies to capital
granted to the smaller region ﬁnanced by a proportional nation-wide labour income tax.
This may lead, with partial liberalization, to the disappearance of the industry in the
smaller region. However, the smaller region may rapidly reindustrialize when inte-
gration progress further.
Such a paradoxical result on the effect of subsidies to poor regions also applies to
the case of two asymmetric regions studied by Dupont and Martin (2006) in a static FC
model. These authors study the effects of four types of subsidy schemes in a static FC
model with two asymmetric regions (again labelled North and South), the ﬁrst couple
designed to encourage ﬁrms relocation to the poor region and the second couple to
boost production in that region:
(i) a subsidy proportional to (operating) proﬁts granted to ﬁrms located in the South
ﬁnanced by a national income tax. This subsidy program determines a shift of
the industry to the South (ﬁrms relocate where subsidies to proﬁt are supplied)
but a worsening of income distribution between workers and capitalists (proﬁt
rise in both regions but a larger number of capital owners lives the North);
(ii) a subsidy to proﬁts granted to ﬁrms located in the South ﬁnanced by a local
income tax. The signs of the effects just mentioned are the same but the mag-
nitudes are different: the relocation of ﬁrms to the South is smaller and the effect
upon and income inequality is larger;
(iii) a subsidy to production (and thus to employment) in the South ﬁnanced by an
economy-wide taxation. Higher competition in the labour market induces a rise
in wages, income inequalities are reduced and relocation to the South is more
pronounced compared to the two previous schemes;
(iv) a subsidy to production in the South ﬁnanced by local taxation. Since taxes (and
higher wages) are paid locally, there is no ﬁscal transfer from the North to the
South. Higher proﬁts are repatriated to the North reproducing the same effects of
a subsidy to proﬁts ﬁnanced locally.
3 Tax Competition and Agglomeration
A key conclusion of the traditional tax competition literature is that tax competition
leads to a loss of industrial capital to competing countries. This conclusion is based on
the following mechanism. Given that capital owners are interested in their after-tax
income, assuming that they are taxed according to source principle (i.e. according to
the rules speciﬁc to the country where income is generated), the comparison of
international tax rates will affect and distort international capital allocation.3
3 A well-known result from the public ﬁnance literature is that capital income taxation according to the
source principle may lead to a distortionary allocation of capital across countries. Thus, the residence
principle, which does not affect capital owners location decisions, is preferable. However, as shown
by Commendatore and Kubin (2016) in a NEG framework, once one allows for a different sectoral
composition between private and public expenditures, the difference between the two taxation
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Producers will move to whichever country has the lowest tax rates and countries will
experience falling tax rates in the attempt to attract or hold on productive activities in
order to raise local tax revenues. This is in a nutshell the well-known result of the “race
to the bottom” of competing governments: countries that try to set a lower tax rate than
their neighbors may end up taxing capital income not at all.4
As recalled by Andersson and Forslid (2003), key features of tax competition
models are: the coexistence of immobile workers and mobile capital, and the question
to what extent public goods can be ﬁnanced by means of taxes on mobile capital. The
“race to the bottom” conclusion will imply that taxation of the mobile factor will be
distorted downwards compared with a situation where all factors are immobile, thus
leading to an inefﬁcient provision of public goods. In this perspective, co-ordination or
harmonization of international tax policies is an issue. Typically, tax harmonization
entails a shift from a non-cooperative tax game to a cooperative tax game, and Pareto
improvement from the government’s perspective follows by deﬁnition (Baldwin and
Krugman 2004).
NEG scholars have shown that this result does not hold in the presence of signiﬁcant
agglomeration economies and goods market integration, and have formally demon-
strated that tax competition over mobile productive factors is affected by industrial
agglomeration. The general argument rests on the result that increased economic inte-
gration leads imperfectly competitive ﬁrms (capital owners) to beneﬁt from agglom-
eration rents that can be taxed. Baldwin et al. (2003) show that such rents arise in a wide
range of NEG models. This will allow a country to raise its tax without losing capital
and/or its industrial base, thus leading to a “race to the top” rather than a “race to the
bottom”. As argued by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), wealthier countries offer capital
favourable external economies and, within limits, this allows them to hold on to mobile
factors of production even while levying higher tax rates than less advanced nations.
However, should the tax rate get too high, the results could be catastrophic: “not only
will capital move abroad, but because that movement undermines agglomeration
economies it may be irreversible” (Baldwin and Krugman 2004, p. 2).
NEG models with public spending (see previous section) often assume some sort of
taxation for the ﬁnancing of public services; however, in that literature, governments
typically do not engage in tax competition. In the following, we review models of tax
competition involving typical NEG features such as imperfect competition, trade costs
and agglomeration rents and thus departing from traditional tax competition analyses.
(Footnote 3 continued)
schemes is less clear-cut. Taxation on the basis of the residence principle is not neutral and may lead to
capital relocation; whereas depending on how tax revenues are allocated between manufactured and
agricultural goods, the corresponding change in the market size may reduce the distortionary effect of
taxation according to the source principle.
4 As summarized by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), the standard tax-competition literature works with
a one period model featuring a single good produced by two factors. Labour is immobile between
locations and capital is mobile. Trade costs are zero, ﬁrms face perfect competition and constant
returns, so there is no trade among regions and capital faces smoothly diminishing returns. Typically,
governments choose the capital tax rate in a Nash game. The standard approach is to compare
equilibrium tax rates with no capital mobility and with perfect capital mobility. The standard result is
such that equilibrium taxes are sub-optimally low.
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While the tax competition and agglomeration literature shares the common
assumption of mobile capital, NEG models with tax competition have originally
explored the case of labour mobility. Accordingly, seminal models can be classiﬁed
according to whether they work under the assumption of labour (Ludema and Wooton
2000, Andersson and Forslid 2003) or capital/entrepreneur mobility (Kind et al. 2000;
Baldwin and Krugman 2004; Ottaviano and Ypersele 2005; Borck and Pflüger 2006).
Regardless differences in the mobility assumption – and other technical aspects – a
general feature, as opposed to traditional tax competition outcomes, is that results
depend on the degree of production agglomeration. Typically, when the mobile factor
is concentrated, the associated the taxable rents imply that taxes will remain high
without inducing relocation, provided that – in general – the international tax gap is
smaller than the agglomeration rent.
Ludema and Wooton (2000) were the ﬁrst to recognize the lack of theoretical work
on the link between the two related issues arising from deeper economic integration:
the erosion of ﬁscal autonomy experienced by integrating countries brought about by
more mobile tax bases; and the spatial agglomeration of economic activity driven by
divergent economic structures and incomes across the integrating countries. In moti-
vating their interest in bringing together the two issues in a NEG framework, the
authors explain the additional mechanism induced by international tax competition by
which economic integration can have distributional consequences, thus providing the
general rational at the core of the subsequent literature. That is, while agglomeration
alters the distribution of income across countries, tax competition influences the dis-
tribution of income across factors. In Ludema and Wooton (2000) words, “if immobile
factors compete to create or maintain a core by offering low (or negative) taxes to
mobile manufacturing labor, they run the risk that much of the potential gain to having
a core is dissipated in the process. If so, then agglomerative forces coupled with the tax
competition may impoverish immobile factors, regardless of location” (Ludema and
Wooton 2000, p. 333). For this reason, the question to be addressed is whether eco-
nomic integration, by strengthening agglomerative forces, will intensify tax competi-
tion and will thus result in lower equilibrium taxes or not.
In order the answer to this question, Ludema and Wooton (2000) modify the
Krugman (1991) model in two aspects. First, manufacturing ﬁrms are quantity-setting
(Cournot) oligopolists, as opposed to the monopolistic competition approach com-
monly taken in NEG models. This departure allows obtaining closed-form solutions,
while preserving all of the relevant characteristics of Krugman's model. Second,
manufacturing workers are assumed to be imperfectly mobile. This assumption enables
to study the effects of economic integration on the intensity of tax competition under
two notions of international integration modelled as either an increase in factor mobility
or as a reduction in trade costs on goods. They conclude that integration interpreted as
decreasing trade costs reduces the intensity of tax competition, thus restoring rather
than eroding ﬁscal autonomy. On the other hand, integration interpreted as increased
labor mobility has mixed effects.
Andersson and Forslid (2003) use the Forslid and Ottaviano (1999) version of the
Krugman (1991) model to study the effects of taxes on skilled and unskilled workers on
the location of manufacturing production. In the model, proportional taxes on immobile
unskilled workers and mobile skilled workers ﬁnance country-speciﬁc public goods.
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The authors study the impact of taxes on the stability of a dispersed equilibrium and
ﬁnd that it depends on the relationship between taxes on mobile labor and taxes on
immobile labor. In particular, a small tax redistribution from mobile to immobile
workers makes the dispersed equilibrium unstable, causing a catastrophic agglomera-
tion where all skilled workers end up in one country. In line with Ludema and Woodon
(2000), once the agglomeration is established and the related agglomeration rents arise,
taxes on mobile workers are not generally driven down to some minimum in the “core”
country as predicted by traditional tax competition.
As opposed to Ludema and Wooton (2000) and Andersson and Forslid (2003),
Kind et al. (2000) investigate how spatial agglomeration of economic activity affects
the outcome of capital tax competition in a NEG framework with mobile capital, thus
obtaining results directly comparable with those obtained in the traditional literature on
capital tax competition. They show that the outcome of tax competition depends on the
interaction between two forces of agglomeration: trade costs and pecuniary externali-
ties. The analysis considers the two alternative scenarios of capital (and ﬁrms) either
concentrated in one single location or evenly distributed between two countries. When
capital is concentrated in one single country, a government may be able to exploit the
locational rents created by agglomeration forces through a positive source tax and this
in turn will lead to an increase in national welfare. This result is in line with the
conclusion of Ludema and Woodon (2000) as it shows that increased economic inte-
gration achieved via lower trade costs allows a country to raise its tax on mobile capital
without losing productive resources. Indeed, since agglomeration makes capital
effectively immobile due to pecuniary externalities, the host country gains from setting
its source-tax on capital above that of the other country, thus increasing its welfare per
capita. In the opposite case of industrial activities evenly spread across countries, the
equilibrium outcome is such that both countries provide a subsidy of equal size to
capital.
Perhaps the most well-known contribution in this ﬁeld is the one by Baldwin and
Krugman (2004), which challenges the idea that the integrating nations should agree on
common tax rates in order to avoid the “race to the bottom” and undermine their
relatively generous welfare states. Its popularity is probably due to two reasons. First,
the policy implication it carries on the desirability of tax harmonization. Second, the
capability it has to explain observed corporate tax differentials in integrating regions
such as European Union in terms of external economies due to agglomeration forces.
The results of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) are obtained within the solvable variant of
the model of Krugman (1991) due to Forslid (1999), where the two otherwise identical
countries have different tax rates. Entrepreneurs are the mobile factor, while workers
are immobile. Agglomeration forces imply that the real reward of entrepreneurs
includes a location speciﬁc agglomeration rent. That is, entrepreneurs located in the
country that initially has the core strictly prefer to locate there and would thus be
willing to bear a higher tax in order to be there. There exists a bell-shaped relationship
between agglomeration rents (and tax rates that entrepreneurs are willing to pay) and
trade openness. Indeed, when trade is impossible, ﬁrms cannot serve both markets from
a single location and agglomeration is not possible. At the opposite extreme, when
trade is completely free, location is irrelevant and agglomeration is useless. Hence, the
importance of agglomeration is greatest (the tax rate the entrepreneurs is higher)
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at intermediate values of openness (where agglomeration is both feasible and useful).
This implies that size of the locational rent is a bell-shaped function of the level of
integration, so the tax gap ﬁrst widens before narrowing as integration increases. From
the policy perspective, the model delivers a result in sharp contrast with the traditional
tax competition literature: harmonization makes one or both countries worse off when
agglomeration forces are present.
Interestingly, Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) contribute to the tax competition
and agglomeration literature by exploring three related issues. First, the distortions
induced by tax competition on the international allocation of capital and, as a conse-
quence, on the inefﬁcient international specialization in production. Second, the sub-
sequent inefﬁciencies caused to the pattern of international trade. Third, the impact of
these inefﬁciencies on the gap in economic development among countries. According to
the authors, the extant literature on tax competition and agglomeration – with the partial
exception represented by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) – lacks a detailed welfare
analysis able to reach a conclusion on the desirability of tax competition. Accordingly,
they propose a full-fledge global welfare analysis in a general equilibrium model in
which two countries compete for monopolistically competitive ﬁrms à la Ottaviano et al.
(2002). Results are obtained using as a benchmark the free market outcome that yields a
home market effect: the larger country hosts a more than proportionate share of ﬁrms.
Unless trade costs are low enough, such an outcome is shown to be inefﬁcient because it
leads too many ﬁrms to concentrate in the larger country. In the tax competitive out-
come, the location of ﬁrms is less concentrated than the free market one. When trade
costs are large enough to make it inefﬁcient for all ﬁrms to cluster in a single country, tax
competition for mobile ﬁrms is efﬁciency-enhancing with respect to the free market
outcome. This result is reversed as trade costs fall and clustering becomes efﬁcient.
Finally, under both free market and tax competition, the inefﬁciencies in international
specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough. Otherwise, only
international tax coordination can implement the efﬁcient spatial distribution of ﬁrms.
All these results lead to conclude that “the policy attitude towards tax competition
should depend on the degree of trade integration…at the initial stages of an integration
process, forbidding tax competition without agreeing on tax coordination is a bad idea. It
is much less so at later stages, when the free market and the harmonization outcomes
tend to coincide” (Ottaviano and van Ypersele 2005, p. 45).
The models discussed above deal with variants of CP models with either symmetric
equilibria or equilibria with complete agglomeration. Borck and Pflüger (2006) take
one step forward and study whether the “race to the top” result suggested by previous
work generalizes to a NEG framework, which features stable locational equilibria with
only partial agglomeration of ﬁrms in one of two countries. The model draws on
Pflüger (2004)5 and shows that, in addition to the extreme outcome of complete
agglomeration, a tax differential may arise as an equilibrium of the tax game between
the two countries even when there is only partial agglomeration. In particular, in the
5 Pflüger (2004) develops a model that deviates from the standard CP model in two respects. First, it is
assumed that the ﬁxed cost in the manufacturing sector consists of a separate internationally mobile
factor (Forslid 1999; Forslid and Ottaviano 2003). Second, the Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility is
replaced by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility speciﬁcation.
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case with partial agglomeration, the partial core can maintain a positive tax gap even
though no agglomeration rent accrues to the mobile factor.
4 Trade: Unilateral Protectionism and Trade Agreements
This section reviews trade policy implications of theoretical NEG models. We discuss
unilateral actions of protection and liberalisation that aim at industrialisation, as well as
trade agreements.
The most basic, symmetric NEG models yield a counter-intuitive result when it
comes to unilateral protection. Import substitution in the form of unilateral protection
always beneﬁts the protecting region or nation (see for example Baldwin et al. 2003,
Chap. 12).6 This so-called “price-lowering-protection” (PLP) mechanism works
because the price-lowering inflow of ﬁrms into the home market exceeds the more
direct price-increasing effect of protectionism.7 Therefore, it seems that unilateral
protection is one strategy to gain welfare and attract industry. There are, however, some
qualiﬁcations to be made.
The ﬁrst one is the introduction of relocation costs. When it is costly for ﬁrms to
change location, then unilateral protection has different impacts on the price index
depending on (i) the costs of relocation, (ii) the trade openness of the respective nations
and (iii) the relative strengths of agglomeration forces in the respective nations. The
higher the costs for relocating, the more an unilateral protection will raise the price
index because the offsetting inflow of ﬁrms does not take place. The level of relocation
costs that prohibits the PLP is lower the easier it is to export to the foreign country and
the stronger are the agglomeration forces in the home market. A second qualiﬁcation to
the PLP is the fact that a country has to be large enough for ﬁrms to have an incentive
to relocate there. If the market size is too small, then unilateral protection will always
raise the price index. Third, as long as factor endowments are assumed identical, there
is no place for a comparative advantage (CA) story. Introducing such a
Heckscher-Ohlin CA alters the PLP. Baldwin et al. (2003) assume different ﬁxed costs
across regions in order to model that. CA leads to a third effect of unilateral protection
on the price index, the so-called “negative variety effect”. Asymmetric trade barriers
now have a negative effect on the total number of ﬁrms. While there exists no analytical
solution to the model anymore, the authors are able to derive results for a special case.
They ﬁnd that the PLP does not work when CA is strong enough.
As Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 297) point out, the PLP clearly is an artefact of the
speciﬁc model assumptions: “The notion that unilateral protection always lowers the
domestic price level by enticing industry to relocate is certainly one of the most
outlandish policy implications of simple economic geography models.” They use the
6 This chapter is in parts based on Puga and Venables (1997), Puga and Venables (1999) and Baldwin
(1999). The political economy side of the discussion can for example be found in Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007).
7 Unilateral protection – represented as an increase in trade costs only in one direction – increases the
price consumers have to pay for imported commodities, which involve a welfare loss similar to the
one in standard models without factor mobility.
30 P. Commendatore et al.
vertical linkages version of the FC model to show that unilateral liberalisation can lead
to industrialisation. On the one hand, liberalisation may lower the costs of imported
intermediate goods, which in turn makes the liberalising country more attractive for
ﬁrms. On the other hand, if it decreases the costs of shipping ﬁnal goods to this country,
it would make it less attractive as a location for ﬁrms. Hence, in order to attract some
industry, a country would have to liberalise the intermediate goods market without
affecting the ﬁnal goods market. However, they also show that an across-the-board
liberalisation could have a similar effect if the liberalising country is small and the other
markets are relatively large and open.
What about comparative advantage? It can be shown that in models of economic
geography, smaller, poorer countries might well be without industry despite the pos-
sible CA due to lower wages compared to the richer country. The presence of
agglomeration effects can dominate any trade or location patterns that would result
from CA. If this is the case, the effect is stronger, (i) the stronger are agglomeration
forces, (ii) the more expensive trade is, (iii) the smaller the market of the smaller
country, and (iv) the higher possible trade barriers imposed by richer industrialised
countries against manufacturing goods from smaller poorer countries. All of the
analysis above is based on the FC or the FCVL model that do not feature an
endogenous market size (because capital income is remitted back to the – regionally
immobile – capital owners). Allowing for an endogenous market size and thus intro-
ducing circular causality strengthens the argumentation.
A further topic in this discussion is tariffs and quotas. While they might be equiv-
alent in the simpler trade model, they are not in NEG models. Tariffs and quotas might
lead to relocation into the protecting country due to the “price-lowering-protection”
(PLP) effect. However, the locational equilibrium differs between quotas and tariffs,
which is due to the different recipients of the trade rents. A tariff is collected by the
protecting nation (and paid out to its residents) while a quota shifts the trade rent to the
exporting ﬁrm. Thus, the operating proﬁt for a ﬁrm exporting under a quote is larger than
for a ﬁrm that exports under a tariff. This in turn leads to a situation where ﬁrms
exporting to the protecting nation are more likely to stay where they are. This also means
that ﬁrms in the protecting nation (and the other for that matter) are more likely to lobby
for quotas than for tariffs. This is because higher proﬁts from a tariff would be driven to
zero by ﬁrms that enter the protecting nation. A quota, therefore, has a smaller effect on
the PLP because of less movement of ﬁrms and an increasing effect on proﬁts in both
trading regions.
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a model with ﬁrm heterogeneity to focus on
the interplay of market size, ﬁrm productivity and ﬁrm location. Unilateral liberalisa-
tion of a country leads to a decrease in competition in the liberalising country and an
increase in the other country, which is driven by the cost cut-off that determines if a
ﬁrm is productive enough to produce in a given country. The cut-off increases due to
the liberalisation. The change in competition means a welfare loss for the liberalising
country and a welfare gain in the other country. This result only holds in the long run
when ﬁrms enter markets, while the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed in the short run. In the
short run an unilateral liberalisation ﬁrst leads to a decrease of the cost cut-off resulting
in a pro-competitive effect. The increase in varieties that are exported dominates the
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exit of local producers. To summarize, unilateral liberalisation ﬁrst leads to an increase
and then a decrease in welfare.
What the above discussion makes clear is that the welfare implications from more
traditional trade models can be altered and even reversed when we consider NEG
features such as the mobility of factors. While the price lowering protection effect is
able to reverse the classical welfare implications, it very much depends on the speciﬁc
model assumptions.
The second topic that we would like to review in this section on trade policy
concerns the economic effects of preferential trade agreements. The standard analysis
uses a Heckscher Ohlin model with two countries that form a union and a third, outside
country. The union countries reduce mutual tariffs while maintaining the outside tariff,
which leads to more specialisation within the union, creates additional trade between
the countries of the union and diverts trade from the outside country to the countries
inside the union. In a NEG perspective, the focus shifts from different countries
(characterised by comparative advantages) to similar/identical countries and, in par-
ticular, factor mobility is possible. It turns out that – while the Heckscher-Ohlin results
are still visible – NEG forces substantially alter the results. Note that for these questions
multi-regional NEG models are indispensable. This stream of literature explicitly
compares models with iso-elastic and with linear demand functions, where the latter –
as pointed out above – introduces an additional dispersion force via a variable mark-up.
An early account is found in Baldwin et al. (2003, Chap. 14), which is mainly
based and expands on Puga and Venables (1997). The authors present a multiregional
footloose capital model in which demand functions are iso-elastic and capital is mobile
between all countries. Reducing internal tariffs, i.e. reducing internal trade costs,
improves market access for manufacturing ﬁrms inside the union and factor rewards
increase, which in turn attracts factors from the outside country to move into the union.
A production shifting effect occurs: the manufacturing sector inside the union grows
(due to factor migration). If countries inside the union are of different size, NEG
agglomerative processes may lead to a core-periphery pattern with all the industry
ending up in the bigger country. In addition, the authors explicitly address welfare
issues: they show that welfare in the union increases, whereas it declines in the outside
country. Monfort and Nicolini (2000) construct a two-country core-periphery model
each of which consists of two regions, in which factor mobility occurs only within
countries. The authors show that also in this model set up deeper integration inside both
countries may trigger agglomeration processes. Interestingly, the authors ﬁnd similar
results for external trade liberalisation (similar also Monfort and Van Ypersele 2003).
In a related paper, Commendatore et al. (2016) also use a footloose capital model with
two countries inside a union and one outside country and two production sectors:
agriculture that produces a homogenous commodity and manufacturing that produces
differentiated commodities. In contrast, the demand functions are linear; and factor
mobility occurs only within the union. Reducing internal trade costs again increases
manufacturing factor rewards inside the union (via a better market access), which leads
to a higher employment in manufacturing sector within the union. It is interesting to
note that the manufacturing sector grows even if ﬁrm migration from the outside
country is not possible. It grows because it attracts additional workers from the agri-
cultural sector in each of the union countries. In this sense, the union specialises in
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manufacturing and – as a mirror image – the outside country specializes in agriculture.
It leads to higher exports of the union, and to higher trade within the union. Integration,
thus, leads to specialization, trade creation and trade diversion. These effects are similar
to a Heckscher-Ohlin perspective. However, further reducing the trade costs may lead
to a predominance of agglomeration forces within the union causing a core-periphery
pattern of industrial activity. Competition is stronger in the newly formed core and –
given the linear demand functions – ﬁrms react by reducing the price and further
increasing the output. Specialization of the union in the manufacturing sector is rein-
forced, and trade creation and trade diversion become stronger. Thus, NEG forces
corroborate and modify the static Heckscher Ohlin assessment of integration areas.
Another stream of papers shifts the focus from internal integration to external trade
liberalisation, i.e. to a reduction of trade costs between the union and the outside
country. These studies stress that the impact w.r.t. regional inequalities in the union
depends upon model speciﬁcations (see Brülhart 2011). A ﬁrst group of models
incorporates iso-elastic demand functions and thus constant mark-ups. The models
typically assume that productive factors are mobile only within a country, but not
between countries. A reduction of external trade costs increases market access for both
countries within the union, agglomeration forces are strengthened, whereas competition
from the other union country becomes less important. Thus, agglomeration force
dominate and external trade liberalisation leads to internal agglomeration (see Paluzie
2001; Brülhart et al. 2004; Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran 2004; Commendatore et al.
2014). Finally, in a quite comprehensive study Zeng and Zhao (2010) study the
interaction of internal integration, external liberalization and the degree of international
factor mobility. They show that international factor mobility may actually reverse the
results obtained with internationally immobile productive factors. A second group of
models introduces additional dispersion forces: Krugman and Elizondo (1996) take into
account that factor migration leads to an increase in land rentals and commuting costs;
Behrens (2011) uses linear demand functions, which imply lower mark-ups if more
competitors operate in the markets. This additional dispersion force may actually
reverse the result: External liberalisation leads to internal dispersion instead of
agglomeration. In a related paper, Behrens et al. (2007) study the interaction of a
reduction in international and intranational trade costs. They show that “lower intra-
national transport costs foster regional divergence when international trade costs are
high enough, whereas lower international trade costs promote regional convergence
when intranational transport costs are high enough” (Behrens et al. 2007, p. 1297).
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